Smith on Sympathy and Selfishness in the Wealth of Nations, Book 1, Chapters 1-3

I'm hardly the first person to note that "The Adam Smith Problem"--that apparent contradiction between the sympathy ascribed to humanity in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and the self-interestedness ascribed to humanity in The Wealth of Nations--is itself problematic, based as it is on a mistaken premise about what Smith actually argues in these texts. But, revisiting Smith this weekend, I'm struck by the fact that these two texts are more attuned to each other than even mainstream Smith scholarship seems to think. (I say this knowing that, despite relatively wide reading at this point, I still haven't scratched the surface of Smith scholarship...so it's both possible and likely that I've missed a source that takes a similar view to the one I'm about to outline!)

This term, I'm teaching a grad seminar on various conceptual (rather than historical or practical) overlaps between narrative art (especially opera) and economic theory in the 18th century. The purpose of the course is not to ask how the economics of performance or artistic production worked back then, but rather to investigate how the various ideas and preconceptions that gave rise to the birth of economics (especially to Smith's writings) also structured the way various artists were thinking about character, narrative, plot, and psychology at the time--that is to say, how the conceptual structure of early economic thinking enabled a certain kind of artistic output to arise. We've spent the first few weeks of term grappling with various musicological texts on market culture and its effect on the works of Haydn, Mozart, and Beethoven especially--but starting next week, we will begin to read Smith. I opted to begin with WN rather than TMS.

My romp through WN this weekend is my second time opening this book. I read it for the first time in 2021, and now I'm rereading portions specifically with an eye to class discussions this term. Reading it the first time, I was overwhelmed by the system of thought it put across, and the encyclopedic completeness with which it communicated this system. It was also the first Smith I had read. Now as I reread it, I have the benefit of also having read TMS, his History of Astronomy, a bunch of his essays (including the excellent writings on music, the imitative arts, etc.), and some of his lectures on rhetoric.

All of this is to say, I'm approaching WN with a vastly different structure of background knowledge from what I had back in 2021. And the experience of reading even the first few chapters is indeed strikingly different from what I recall from two years ago. Here are the things that stand out to me, on the level of argument and rhetoric.

First, and most broadly--and pace all those commentators (such as Russ Roberts, whose How Adam Smith Can Change Your Life is fun, but now seems a bit misleading)--Smith does not begin WN with an appeal to selfishness. There is a famous sentence, quoted by virtually all the commentators I've read, which runs:

"It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interests. We address ourselves, not to their humanity, but to their self-love..."

Yes, it's clear that this is the ur-statement of self-interest it is often taken to be; yet I find it significant, upon re-approaching this text, that it is placed in Chapter 2 rather than Chapter 1. Chapter 1, far from promulgating (much less recommending) a view of the fundamental selfishness of people, is all about the seeming-miracle of coordination among those who work together in individual industries. Smith marvels at the productiveness that arises with the division of labor, and implies, both in this first chapter and in Chapter 3, that the mechanism which allows the general increase in prosperity, productivity, and well-being to occur is a result of mutual, imaginative sympathy as much as it might be a result of self-interest. Chapter 1 reads like proto-Hayek on the distribution of knowledge through society (and anticipates, also, the famous "I, Pencil" essay by Leonard Read. Smith portrays the most successful people as those who work together to complement each others' needs, and even in his appeal to the "limit of market power" in Chapter 3, he suggests that an awareness of other people's interests and desires is itself the factor that determines what professions each individual can pursue. In itself, this framing of the first chapter, and the fact that Chapter 2 (with the "self-interest" statement quoted above) is tucked quietly between Chapters 1 and 3, undermines the apparent distinction between the worldview encoded in TMS and that encoded in WN.

There are some other interesting quirks of rhetoric and argument I noted as I made my way through these chapters, as well. For instance, I am struck by the mode of presentation of the division of labor idea. Smith could easily have begun the book with a statement along the lines of what we read in Chapter 2; he could also have begun Chapter 1 with a clear, overarching statement of the idea he will come to by the end of the chapter. Instead, however, he begins immediately with an example. He states that it will be easier for the reader to grasp the overall concept if he begins this way--a bit inductivistic, alas, but unsurprising given the Zeitgeist--but what he actually does, right on the first page, is to make a basic point about invisibility and evidence. He states that the effects of the division of labor are greatest precisely where they cannot be observed directly: in small enterprises, he tells us, it's easy to see people working on individual components of a project, whereas in large societal enterprises the work is so widely distributed that nobody can actually see all of it happen, nor grasp the extent of division it takes to complete it. Reading this passage after having read the History of Astronomy, I'm struck by the fact that this explanation is a concrete manifestation of a point he implies w/r/t the philosophy of science, namely that the task of science is to explain the seen in terms of the unseen. He immediately appeals to, and strengthens, his reader's tolerance for arguments invoking invisible mechanisms. The effect of this is not only to lead up to the famed Invisible Hand (though I think it does that as well!), but to bolster the subsequent arguments and anecdotes concerning coordination and the extent/power of the market, which relies on a sense that an invisible network of sympathies and imaginings connects all of the individual people in society.

Even the statement concerning self-interest, in Chapter 2, is not what it seems when quoted out of context. Smith begins the chapter by distinguishing the behavior of animals from that of humans. Animals have to look cute, he says, and appeal to humans' good nature, if they want a human to pamper them. Humans, he says by contrast, are forced to think rationally about what other people want. The ensuing statement about the self-interestedness of the butcher, baker, and brewer looks on the surface like it defends a view of humanity as intrinsically selfish. But it seems to me that it rather urges people to sympathize more with those around them, for the very mechanism by which we could even imagine the desires of the baker, brewer, or butcher is precisely the sympathetic impulse taken up in TMS. Smith speaks explicitly of self-interestedness, but implicitly gives us an explanatory structure that depends entirely on sympathy, coordination, and an imaginative effort towards fellow-feeling.

Finally, I'll just note a few fun things that occurred to me while reading today. First, Smith anticipates the argument (end of Chapter 1) that it's better to be a poor person in a wealthy nation than a wealthy person in a very poor nation. He puts the point in terms of Britain vs. Africa; but of course what comes to my mind, also, is the quite uncontroversial claim that I'm better off living in middle-to-lower class America in 2023 than I would be if I could change places with even the wealthiest nobleman in 1600. (This point is underscored, also, by my current reading of Katherine Rundell's John Donne biography, which paints a grim picture indeed of many aspects of life back then.) Second, I was struck by Smith's observation that automation generally makes things better for workers--a point anticipating Milton Friedman's argument to the same effect. Friedman said in some lecture or other that the invention, say, of running water did more to alleviate the lot of the poor than of the ultra-rich, since, as he puts it, the wealthy have always had running water (carried on the backs of their slaves or servants), and that it is in fact those carrying the water who are saved from their toil by the advance of technology. For Smith, too, it is the boy who wants to play with his friends who benefits from ingeniously devising a mechanism to do his work for him. This anticipates the Suitsian Utopia laid out in The Grasshopper, in which only those who wish to work need to work, and everyone else is essentially playing games. Finally, I will just gleefully note that Smith, too, treats animals (Chapter 2) as being essentially automata, a point that slots nicely alongside my earlier, cursory musings about Descartes and ChatGPT.

Favorite books and music of 2022

 As the season of "Year in Review" posts comes to an end, I'm thinking not only about the projects I saw through to completion this year (the biggest of which were the final revisions of my book manuscript), but the wonderful array of books and music I've consumed this year. Here's the roundup, along with some comments and observations.

Music

Strangely, my music consumption this year was modest compared to what it's been during previous years. Perhaps I was so absorbed with my various writing tasks, as well as with grant applications, prep for my CD recording in June, and the like, that I just didn't have it in me to engage in the depth of listening to match what I did in 2021. However, there were a few noteworthy albums I enjoyed. In classical music, the biggest discovery was Benjamin Allard's recording of the complete Bach organ works (with a few clavichord performances thrown in). I'm trying to listen to this relatively closely, so I've been slow to progress through the huge set; however, even just judging by the first couple of discs, the achievement is amazing. The playing is spectacular, and the music--much of which is new to me--is really brilliant. I've also been listening somewhat obsessively to the Peabody Trio's recording of Beethoven's Op.70 (these are on modern instruments, but are wonderfully flexible and deep), as well as to Robert Levin's complete Mozart sonata cycle, which I'll be reviewing next year. Outside of classical music, I've really enjoyed Ethan Iverson's jazz album "Every Note Is True" (especially for its large-scale pacing).

Books

But it was a good year for reading! As ever, I've been somewhat lazy about keeping up with academic literature in my field. I tend to think that the bad stuff, which isn't worth reading anyway, will turn out not to have mattered, and that the good stuff will keep rearing up over the coming years, and that if this is true it makes sense to hold off and read things a few years after they're published. Nonetheless, I did enjoy some new or new-ish academic books. Highlights in this category were:

• Matt Strohl, Why It's OK to Love Bad Movies (not exactly in my field, but there were enough resonances with my academic interests that I was able to review it for the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism)
• Adeline Mueller, Mozart and the Mediation of Childhood (a brilliant and exacting study, the kind that makes me realize just how lazy a historian I actually am)
• Rebecca Cypess, Women and Musical Salons in the Enlightenment
• Mark Ferraguto, Beethoven 1806
• Yoel Greenberg, How Sonata Forms (an excellent book, written in fabulous prose. The hardcore music-theory portions I'm not really qualified to comment on, but the premise, framing, and methodological discussions are revelatory and pertinent)
• Nicholas Mathew, The Haydn Economy
• Tom Beghin, Beethoven's French Piano
• John Butt, Bach's Dialogue with Modernity (can't believe it took me so long to get to this!)
• I also read a bunch of Benedict Taylor, whose stuff is pretty amazing (The Melody of Time remains a highlight)

Outside of academic writing, I had a particularly rich year of reading novels. Because I don't tend to keep track of how many novels I read per year, I don't actually know whether there were more than usual in 2022 (and in any case, I'm usually reading some sort of fiction)--but I have the sense that there were. Interestingly, although I didn't explicitly set out to read novels by women (I had tried this sort of thing in 2017 or '18, deciding to read only female novelists for a year), much of what I read ended up being by women, just by accident. There were some revelatory new finds for me:

• I read three novels by the wonderful Tessa Hadley - Free Love, Late in the Day, and The Past. I suspect that The Past may have been, in some absolute sense, the "best" of these; but Late in the Day was the one I found most moving and important, for my own life
• Octavia Butler, Blood Child - I didn't really enjoy this collection, but I'm told that my taste is faulty
• Hilary Mantel, Beyond Black - this was an amazing book, with some of the most beautiful sentences I've read in a long time. I didn't ultimately care for the story or characters, but the truly gorgeous prose was enough to keep me involved
• Elizabeth Bowen, The House in Paris - spectacular novel. If Mantel's sentences are the most beautiful I've read recently, Bowen is perfection at the level of the paragraph. A gorgeous novel, in every way.
• J.M. Coetzee, Foe - it took me about 66% of the book before I really got into it, but once this happened, it was excellent. And it's interesting to see seeds of Coetzee's trademark terseness in this early book of his. It was less sparse than his mature work, but there were passages of real beauty, where one had the sense that each word had been chosen with astonishing care, and this seemed to prefigure the experience of reading, say, Disgrace or Elizabeth Costello.
• Nabokov, Mary - again, astonishing prose, and remarkable book
• Rachel Cusk, Aftermath - is it fiction, or not? I found it moving but perplexing
• Proust, Swann's Way, in the Lydia Davis translation. This was great, and I tweeted a bit (in May? June?) about some favorite passages. I didn't love Proust when I read the cycle (in the old translation) some years ago, and though I see that this new edition is a big improvement, I still mostly didn't enjoy the text. There were some wonderful, revelatory, moving passages, though! But I found myself thinking back to that quip about Wagner, that there are lovely moments separated by terrible half-hours.
• Amor Towles, A Gentleman in Moscow - recommended by a friend. Very easy to read, feels like literary candy. I didn't like the prose style, which felt smarmy and smug...but the last third of the book had some lovely things in it, and the ending was moving.
• Orwell, 1984
• Skinner, Walden Two

I also read some wonderful non-academic nonfiction:

• Russ Roberts, Wild Problems - highly recommended, very humane book with lots of wisdom in it
• Dan Moller, The Way of Bach - also highly recommended, a rare success at turning some detailed philosophical discussions of music and art into a reader-friendly trade book with a narrative arc. A model for what I'm trying to write at the moment, and far smarter, better, and deeper than some other attempts at this genre
• Tyler Cowen, An Economist Gets Lunch - tons of fun! I was less thrilled with his Discover Your Inner Economist
• Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist

I also read some good academic books from other fields, most notably Joel Mokyr, A Culture of Growth, Aaron Hanlon, A World of Disorderly Notions, Cowen, In Praise of Commercial Culture, and a few others.

All of this probably means that the "Recommended Books" tab on this blog needs to be updated!

Finally, I started and then abandoned a bunch of books that I just couldn't get into, despite (in all of these cases) wanting to be able to get into them. Perhaps my tastes just aren't quite up to the task, or I'm missing something?

• Ali Smith, Autumn
• Susan Blum, Ungrading
• Oliver Roeder, Seven Games (this, for instance, was a book I really wanted to love)
• Larry Lockridge, The Great Cypress Think Tank
• Jeremy Denk, Every Good Boy Does Fine
• Nick Riggle, On Being Awesome
• Laura Kipnis, Against Love
• Agnes Callard, Aspiration
• George Saunders, A Swim in a Pond in the Rain

I'm sure there were others as well, but I can't remember them.

And to end, I'll say that what I'm most looking forward to reading at the beginning of 2023 is more Elizabeth Bowen, Anita Brookner, and Maeve Brennan! Another year beginning with female novelists.

Happy new year!

Reading the Foreword to "Ungrading"

Following my "Experiments in Grading" post of a few weeks ago, a colleague suggested that I peruse the newish volume Ungrading (ed. Susan Blum; West Virginia University Press, 2020). I haven't yet gotten far in the collection, and in any case I don't expect to read the book cover-to-cover, since not all of the topics are equally applicable to my interests or pedagogical problems. However, I had some reactions while reading the Foreword by Alfie Kohn. I'll record a few of these thoughts here, and follow up with future posts as I read more of the book. (I'll also continue to edit and expand my earlier post on grading.)

In general, in the Foreword (and, from what I can tell, perhaps the rest of the volume as well), the case against grades is vastly overstated. Kohn describes nine steps along the path from grading to ungrading--and although I have followed some parts of this path myself, my underlying rationale is almost always very different from the reasons stated here.

Kohn's first step:

We start by worrying about grade inflation before gradually coming to realize the real problem is grades themselves.

I certainly have worried at times about grade inflation...but what about the second part of that sentence? I would frame the issue not as "the real problem is grades themselves," but rather as "grades are problematic." In my previous post, I outlined a number of reasons why I think that grades are problematic, mostly involving the conceptual overburdening of grades, and attendant practical issues that arise as a result. I stand by this, yet it doesn't necessarily follow that grades themselves are "the problem." Grades do accomplish at least some useful purposes, including signaling. Indeed, if Bryan Caplan is correct that signaling is the overarching aim of academia and schooling, then some form of grades are inevitable, since the system wouldn't be able to function unless something facilitated this basic end. Of course, as I also acknowledge elsewhere, to the extent that grades serve as signals, they are imperfect signals, not least because they don't usually carry any explanatory detail. To outsiders who want to know whether a student is competent, grades only indicate the barest outlines of an answer; and to students receiving grades without an accompanying explanation, no real learning can take place because the feedback implied by grades is too diffuse to provoke any particular improvements. But, be that as it may, some version of this problem will be replicated in virtually any system for signaling quality that goes short of actually describing, in real detail, individual skill-sets. For this reason, some system like grades is probably a necessary part of life. It isn't clear that this system or any other is itself "the problem".

Kohn's second step:

...We make sure that everyone can, in theory, get an A. Only then do we realize that rating, too, is a problem, even if a less egregious one than ranking. We've eliminated the strychnine of competition, but there is more to be done if we're still dispensing the arsenic of extrinsic motivation.

This is an extension of the previous point: ratings are inevitable. But, I think it must be added, they are in some cases beneficial. The only way to improve is to receive feedback on one's abilities and performance, and although I agree that grades aren't the best way to deliver feedback (an objection I raised earlier), it isn't the fact of rating that is the problem, but the fact that the system of rating involving grades ends up, in its purest form, delivering ratings without explanations. The solution here could be very robust rubrics, or detailed commentary. About extrinsic motivation, this doesn't strike me as being obviously problematic. Students are individuals, and as such will be motivated by any number of different considerations; who am I to tell them that only intrinsic motivations matter?

Kohn's third step:

...We stop using letters and numbers to rate what students have done and instead use descriptive labels such as "needs improvement," "developing," "meeting/exceeding expectations," "proficient," and "mastery." Step two: we realize these labels are just grades...by a different name and that we need to get rid of them too.

This is the first point at which my disagreement becomes serious. Such labels are not grades by a different name; they are partial explanations of why a student has succeeded or failed at a particular task, and in what ways. Unlike a straight-up letter grade delivered without accompanying commentary, these explanations do, or at least can, make clear what needs work, and what kind of work would be best. They aren't perfect, of course; and crucially, they leave room for imprecision that can, in the wrong pedagogical hands, end up being just as useless to students as grades themselves often are. But what would remain of education if we got rid of the possibility of telling a student that work needs improvement?

(Incidentally, I also find labels such as these useful when they are applied by editors to my own professional work. One of my own intuitive measures of how useful a particular comment might be to a student is my sense of how helpful the comment would be if an editor voiced it while working through one of my manuscripts. I want to know what doesn't work, what could be better, and, ideally, what steps I might take to make the necessary improvements. Likewise, I assume that students at least want to have the option of hearing similar thoughts from me--and these comments are a baby-step in the right direction, even if they do not end up saying enough.)

I agreed with Kohn's fourth through seventh steps, which advocate for more precision and description in feedback to students--though, again, not because I think grades themselves are bad (which is Kohn's ultimate point) but because I think they are often overburdened or poorly applied, and one of the ways to remedy this is to be more explicit about what the grades are supposed to accomplish.

However, in step 8 we encounter "ungrading" in its most usual form: "we meet with students individually and ask them to propose course grades for themselves, while reserving the right to accept their suggestions." Step 9 is simply an intensified version of step 8: students choose their own final grades, and we reserve no right of refusal.

One problem with this approach is that it places undue psychological pressure on the students. Students find themselves in the position of second-guessing what we professors think about them, and trying to weigh this against what they then think we might think when we see the grade they propose...and I imagine that such mental calculations are ultimately pretty harmful--more harmful, certainly, than what I think they experience when I just go ahead and give them a (probably decent) grade along with some constructive feedback.

Another problem is an extension of what I have already mentioned. Grades do serve a purpose in the culture as a whole (even if mainly for outward-facing signaling), and to strip them of that purpose--which would surely occur if every prof left grading entirely in the hands of students, since external bodies would no longer think of grades as a reliably "objective" standard--would most likely lead not to the abandonment of rating systems altogether, but simply to a new kind of rating system: a different version of the same thing...and here I would invoke the classic argument from conservatism. Why fly to ills we know not of? When you don't yet know what the new system will be like or what further problems it may bring, it's important to make changes that are cautiously incremental rather than radical. It should follow that the best way to deal with the problems posed by grading as it's currently practiced is not to tinker with the culturally-shared elements of the grading system, but to experimentally tweak those aspects that can be safely adjusted within the comparatively private context of one's own syllabuses.

The post formerly known as: Is "Bad Music Love" Equivalent to "Bad Movie Love"?

In mid-January 2022, I wrote a somewhat informal blog-review of Matthew Strohl's excellent, recent book, Why It's OK to Love Bad Movies. As it happens, I ended up reviewing the book a few months later for the Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism - and once I had signed the journal's publishing agreement, I needed to remove the blog post, which overlaps a great deal with my review. When the review is officially published, I will place a link on this page; however, in the meantime, I have deleted any passages that made it into my review...and am leaving whatever passages are unique to the blog post. Although the material that remains is probably fairly impossible to understand, I wanted to preserve these thoughts, since they seem interesting and relevant to other ideas (even if they remain in a somewhat incomprehensible state when isolated like this).

---

The best book I have read so far this year is Matthew Strohl's recently released Why It's OK to Love Bad Movies. Granted, the year has only just begun; yet I think this is probably the best book on the philosophy of art I've read in a long time. The writing is spectacular; the arguments are convincing; and most of all, the sheer love of film conveyed throughout the book is wonderful. Strohl accomplishes in a breezy 194 pages what many other philosophers require many hundreds of pages to do.

Strohl's book is ostensibly about movies; but in fact, it is a defense of the good life. The argument he builds is, initially, focused only on film. He begins by defining a stance of aesthetic appreciation for bad movies, termed Bad Movie Love. It goes like this. When saying that a movie is "so bad it's good,"

"'Good' is being used in the final sense while 'bad' has a special meaning. ...One recognizes that there is some limited sense in which the movie is bad, but...one ultimately judges it to be aesthetically valuable, in part because it's bad in this limited sense." (p.4)

This is a fine place to start, though at first the idea seems like it might veer into question-begging, since even if a bad movie is judged aesthetically valuable, it isn't initially clear why we'd want to dwell on bad movies when there are so many good movies around. I agree with Strohl that Batman and Robin is "so bad it's good"; but for a decent portion of the book I don't yet see why such a film is more worthy of my time than Vertigo, which, let's face it, is "so good it's good". (Or In the Mood for Love, or Adaptation, or Mad Men, or any of the other good-good things I've watched or re-watched recently.)

....

I'm fully convinced by this. I now feel personally liberated to enjoy some of my guilty-pleasure films. Indeed, I'm not only convinced by the arguments, but inspired by them.

It's natural to ask, though, particularly in light of my other interests, whether these arguments apply equally to other areas of aesthetic pursuit. Being both a musician and an avid reader, I can't help but wonder whether Bad Music Love (or Bad Novel Love) is as permissible as Bad Movie Love.

My guess is that, at least in the case of music, the answer is: no. Bad Music Love might be far, far worse than Bad Movie Love. Why? First, the disclaimer: I don't think that I'm biased by being a musicologist. True, my professional work demands that I have discerning musical tastes, and do I spend a lot of time trying to articulate why various compositions are good or bad. And I recognize that my general disposition may seem to place me in the same category as Strohl's imaginary "Professor Stuffypants". But I don't think these biases impinge on my reasoning about this particular point (though my friends might say otherwise...).

My hypothesis involves both the relative quantity of bad music vs. bad movies, and the relative quality of bad music vs. bad movies. I suspect that there is far more bad music in the world than there are bad movies, and that the bad music is infinitely badder than the bad movies.

...

I could write a bad piano sonata today, alone in my apartment, with no money or resources beyond some paper and a pencil. (I don't even need an eraser! This is supposed to be bad; why bother revising?) I would have a harder time making a bad movie. Perhaps I could pull it off with my phone and a selfie-stick...but this would not be the kind of bad movie Strohl would watch, since it would have no reliable distribution, and thus would be unlikely to make its way to his TV. This question of distribution raises another point: it isn't only that bad movies take more time and effort to make than bad music, but that their chances of being preserved and distributed is relatively low. Anyone can write bad music on a manuscript leaf and find that, a couple hundred years later, it will be digitized in the Duben Collection or in the Dresden State Library, awaiting discovery by zealous archivist period-performers who want to play bad music; but not so for bad movies.

The barriers to the distribution of bad movies are not the only salient considerations. Movies (even bad ones) require more people to make than music. This also has its effect. Except in some exceptional cases in which a bad filmmaker has unchecked power (cf. Strohl's discussion of Plan 9 from Outer Space), most movies are made with the involvement and input of more people. This alone almost guarantees the presence of error-correcting mechanisms, since even a bad director may collaborate with people who end up improving the final product. For this reason, I suspect that even most "bad movies" aren't really all that bad--a suspicion corroborated by Strohl's book, which argues that many of these movies, even the Twilight films, are actually rather good. Bad music, on the other hand, can be profoundly bad. Often, no external ear has been engaged to criticize and correct the final product; it is the composer's own intuitions, errors and all, that features in what we end up hearing. (Incidentally, this has changed in the modern era of pop music, where songs are very often written by a performer in collaboration with others behind the scenes...and it's probably for this reason that the percentage of competent pop songs I encounter is far higher than the percentage of competent non-Mozart/non-Haydn 18th-century symphonies I encounter.)

Does any of this change what I make of Strohl's arguments? I suspect so. Perhaps his defense of bad movies is not really a compelling defense of bad movies, but a defense of medium-bad or even pretty-good-but-not-great movies. The movies Strohl discusses are, ultimately still worth our time. We may not be in the mood to ingest Vertigo (just as we may not be in the mood to follow Bach fugues or parse a Schoenberg piano sonata); but in Strohl's hands many movies that seem superficially bad can still contribute much to our life. This is more than I would say of most musical compositions I encounter.

...

Perhaps the saving grace in the case of novels is that, as with film, books require the involvement of multiple people along the path from manuscript to published edition, and thus present opportunities for improvement and error-correction. Much of the art-music produced over the past 700 years survives only in manuscript, or in early published editions, and is thus hit-or-miss in a way that may not apply to published novels or professionally distributed films. Of course, according to Sturgeon's Law, most work in any given domain is bad--and this applies everywhere, including to published novels and professional films. But the error-correcting processes in these media nonetheless seem to function reasonably well in improving overall quality.

One final--contentious--possible explanation for the general high quality of film in comparison with older music and older texts is that aesthetic standards overall have improved over the past century, and thus that art-forms invented more recently have the benefit of having developed within a context of greater artistic and aesthetic understanding. The fact that composers like Bach, Mozart, or Beethoven figured out how to write reliably great music during the 18th century is, when you think about it, completely remarkable considering just how little progress had yet been made in many other areas of cultural, technological, scientific, and philosophical life. That they did succeed where so many of their contemporaries failed is testament both to whatever progress had occurred during and just before their lifetimes; and to the intellectual labor each one of these artists did in improving aesthetic knowledge. (There was probably also a lot of luck involved.) Yet as more general cultural and scientific knowledge improved, so too did artistic standards: thus, my experience suggests that there is a very high likelihood that an unknown, non-canonical piece of music written after around 1850 will be pretty decent; whereas I can't say the same for the period 1750-1800. That film was invented in the 20th century may be at least a partial explanation for the fact that, as Strohl shows, even bad movies can be aesthetically valuable.

My year of listening and reading

[This is an abridged version of a longer post written for violinist.com]

Each year, as the end of December approaches, I receive an array of "year in review" newsletters. 2021 is no exception. Every time I open my inbox I find another such email, with details of performances, recordings, and other musical projects undertaken over the previous 12 months by friends and colleagues. Sometimes, reading these newsletters, I find myself wondering: how do they manage to do so much? But more often I simply enjoy the ritual of reflecting on past successes and shoring up hopes for the future.

However, as 2021 rolls into 2022, and with a fresh wave of Covid-related cancellations and closures on the horizon, I feel aware of the sheer circularity of it all. Never in my experience has the "arrow-of-time" metaphor felt less apt: 2021 doesn't really appear to be over, but (like 2020) seems ready to stretch endlessly into the future. Perhaps as a result, I feel disinclined to take an accounting of accomplishments of the past year, much less to lay out goals for the coming months. But this does seem a moment to reflect on some of the music and books that I consumed over the past year, and which made 2021 more enjoyable than it otherwise would have been.

Listening

Because I began 2020 with a busy concert schedule (albeit one cut off rather abruptly after the first quarter of the year), I count 2021 as the first year I spent mostly off the stage. Of course, there were a few straggling concerts--but, for the most part, in 2021 my musical identity was not that of a performer but of...a listener. This turned out to be the source of many unexpected delights. In the past, I spent so much time making music that I barely found the mental and aural space to enjoy hearing it; yet in 2021, I rediscovered the joys of being in the audience, and particularly of listening in complete cycles rather than just spot-checking favorite movements or works.

During the first portion of the year, I focused almost exclusively on Beethoven, listening to the bulk of his sonata, chamber, and concerto output. Being a card-carrying period performer, I am always on the lookout for compelling recordings that use fortepianos and gut strings, since, particularly with Beethoven, the old instruments make it easier to capture the gripping, volatile excitement of the music. Beethoven pushed players and instruments alike to their limits (and sometimes beyond those limits!), and the danger of the music is often dulled by the power of the modern equipment used by most performers today. It is only because the fortepiano and period violin are comparatively delicate instruments that they can be played, as Beethoven intended, at the very edge of possibility.

For some of Beethoven's repertoire, 2021 gave me the opportunity to revisit favorite cycles from an earlier phase of period performance. I listened twice-through to the marvelous piano sonata cycle by Malcolm Bilson and colleagues. Age has not dulled these performances; the cycle as a whole still strikes me as one of the greatest Beethoven recordings I've ever heard. (I also supplemented this cycle with some other, more recent recordings, including Andreas Staier's exploration of opp.31, 34, and 35.) I also re-listened to Bilson's recording of the Beethoven cello sonatas (with Anner Bylsma), and, here as well, the music-making is extraordinary. Finally, I re-listened a few times to the Beethoven piano concerto cycle, performed by Robert Levin. Although these works have been re-recorded recently by both Ronald Brautigam and Kristian Bezuidenhout, I am still partial to Levin's recording. Whereas the more recent readings find welcome lyricism and clarity in Beethoven's writing, they simply lack Levin's audacity, brilliance, and wit. Although Levin is known primarily as a Mozart performer, I think he is at his best in this slightly later repertoire. The improvised cadenza to the first movement of the Fourth Concerto is a particular highlight--though the other cadenzas, too, as well as the playing overall, are consistently astonishing. (Although I remain committed to my preference for period performances, I also loved a spectacular recent modern-instrument recording by Eugene Albulescu and the Orchestra of Friends.)

I also discovered some more recent Beethoven recordings. The most revelatory was Trio Goya's performance of the Piano Trios op.1. These early works are difficult to bring off well, since they demand that the performers balance both classical polish and lyrical intensity. Previously, I had found the Castle Trio to provide a close approximation; but Trio Goya's readings are deeper in every respect. Speaking of the piano trios, I also recently discovered a wonderful complete cycle by (modern-instrument) Van Baerle Trio. Although I still prefer Trio Goya for Op.1, these readings of the other works in the cycle are wonderfully stylish and sensitive. Alongside these recordings of the piano trios, I listened to several complete violin sonata cycles, including those by Midori Seiler with Jos van Immerseel, Susanna Ogata with Ian Watson, Ralph Holmes with Richard Burnett, and Benjamin Hudson with Mary Verney. In this field, it was difficult to find a clear favorite, since each recording had very different strengths. Finally, I surveyed a few new recordings of the Violin Concerto, of which my favorite modern-instrument reading was by Daniel Lozakovich--though my heart still belongs to both the Monica Huggett recording and the early (and live?) Heifetz/Toscanini recording.

Following my Beethoven phase, I embarked on a survey of Mozart's violin concertos in a number of new period recordings. Here, as with the Beethoven sonatas, it was impossible to choose a favorite, though among recent recordings the cycle by Christoph Koncz was perhaps the most elegant, and the cycle by Nils-Erik Sparf the most creative and compelling. (The classic recording by Monica Huggett remains my benchmark.)

Finally, I ended the year with a pretty obsessive dive into Schubert's Die Schöne Müllerin. My original go-to recording was by Ian Bostridge with Mitsuko Uchida: although the timbre of Bostridge's voice isn't always pleasing, and his intonation is occasionally imperfect, I adore his delivery of the text; and Uchida's piano playing is sublime. However, this year I listened to some other recordings: Mark Padmore with Paul Lewis (gorgeous singing, boring piano playing); Christoph Prégardien with Andreas Staier (abrasive singing, gorgeous piano playing); and Jan Kobow with Kristian Bezuidenhout (difficult to get into at first, and with a handful of imperfect songs...but ultimately mesmerizing). If only it were possible to pair Padmore with Bezuidenhout for this cycle, as Harmonia Mundi has already done for An die ferne Geliebte, Winterreise, Dichterliebe.

Finally, I enjoyed some recordings that didn't fit into any of these three major listening projects. Highlights include: Hank Knox's reading of some Scarlatti sonatas, David Hyun-Su Kim's Schumann, and Trio Goya's spectacular Haydn recording.

Reading

Book recommendations may be of less direct interest to readers here. I didn't do much violin-specific reading in the past year, though there are some broadly music-related books that I very much enjoyed. Two are new (or relatively new) trade books: Dan Moller's The Way of Bach, and Robin Wallace's Hearing Beethoven. Both are beautiful and beautifully-written; the authors reflect on music itself, as well as a wide range of related topics. On the academic side, I read or re-read a number of older books, the most enjoyable of which were Dean Sutcliffe's The Keyboard Sonatas of Domenico Scarlatti, Annette Richards's The Free Fantasia and the Musical Picturesque, David Yearsley's Bach's Feet, and Nina Penner's Storytelling in Opera and Musical Theater. I also kept up a pretty brisk pace through various novels (the best of which were by Dorothy Baker, Shirley Hazzard, Dermot Healy, Martin Amis, and others) and poetry. I wrote about some of those other books in this e-interview back in March. Many of the novels I read this year were brought to my attention by the wonderful literary podcast Backlisted, which has been a source of entertainment and stimulation over the past year and a half.

Happy new year to everyone!